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Village versus State: The Evolution of State-Local Relations
in Vietnam until 
N<JNC T= AC=
Abstract
The traditional perception of the village as a closed and self-regulating corporate commu-
nity has more often than not overstated its high degree of autonomy, downplaying thereby
the interaction between the state and the local social units. This article aims at bringing
some rectification to this type of misrepresentation by considering the dynamics of
state-local relationship from the standpoint of the strategies laid out by the successive
central governments in Vietnam to endeavour to integrate the rural communities into the
national space.
Keywords: Canton (tng), communal charter (hng c), communal house (ình), council of
notables (hi 	ng hào m
c), private land (t in), public land (coˆng in),
register of fields (in b) and of recorded inhabitants (inh b), village chief (xa˜
trng or lª trng)
Under China’s political control and owing to China’s influence from the Tang period on,
the Vietnamese rural commune (referred to in the ancient Vietnamese language as k,
ch, ching, etc., and commonly as làngvillage) started to assume the Chinese term she
 and to be called xa˜, as it took on the role of the primary administrative unit of society.
The term xa˜ was generally adopted under the Trn dynasty, when with the reorganiza-
tion of the regional administrative system in  large villages (i t xa˜) and small
villages (tiu t xa˜) were distinguished, and officials (xa˜ quanxa˜ chính, chief, xa˜ s,
secretary, xa˜ giám, assistant) were appointed to each xa˜ [Toàn Th : II, ; Cng M
c
: I, ]. It was also in  that the first census of the population was carried out, and
the resulting rolls served to determine the amount of taxes and other contributions that
were to be paid to the state. However, the xa˜ did not as a general rule represent the
smallest unit of the regional administration even after this reform, partly because the
command the Trn court could exercise over the entire country was tenuous, to say the
least.)
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  For a general discussion of the socio-economic conditions of the ancient Vietnamese village,
see, among other publications, Nguyn Th Anh []. Detailed analyses of different
aspects of the socio-economic life of four villages in the delta of the Red River are pre-
sented in Papin & Tessier [		].
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Nevertheless, much has been made of the village at all times as the basic unit of
Vietnamese society, as the major point of reference for the Vietnamese people’s behavi-
our and for its socio-political characteristics.) Opinions concur that Confucian influence
in shaping the Vietnamese traditional elite must be balanced against the fundamental
importance of the village at the grassroots of Vietnamese society. In particular, the
village is often said to have been independent of central authority as “a state within
a state” behind its thicket of bamboo, bounding its inhabitants into a meaningful
whole that links place with identity, and dealing with all its own affairs independently.
Being nearly self-sufficient, most of the villages certainly found little cause for contact
with either the government or other communities: theoretical discussions on the eco-
nomic mode of operation of villagers have more often than not focused on “closed
corporate communities,” imagining therefore the villagers as homogenous and resistant
to change.) In other words, the relevant social and political concerns of most Vietnamese
were concentrated within the village itself, according to the Vietnamese proverb having
it that “each village strikes its own drum and worships its own deities,” which suggested
that every village was a unique, distinct, compact and isolated community, with its
specific charter (hng c), customs and laws, its own manners and mores, and its
communal house (ình) serving both as the administrative centre and the place of
worship for the guardian spirit, whose sacred powers, sanctioned by a royal certificate,
were believed to secure the village’s prosperity. Predating supposedly the establishment
of monarchical power, communal charters were at first known by word of mouth, but
under the Trn dynasty many villages already had a written hng c. The charters
grew and evolved along with village life, eventually covering the whole gamut of social
existence.)
Spelling out the rules and rituals associated with every village festival, celebration
and anniversary, enumerating the principles governing agricultural production and
economic life, defining the rules governing human behaviour and relationships within
  What appears to be “local” has been usually linked to key concepts such as “traditional”
and “authentic” to create the myth of village autonomy, which uncritical assessments by
both Vietnamese and foreign scholars have contributed to reinforce [see for example
McAlister : , following Mus : ], saying nothing about the fact that “local-
ity” has often been shaped in relation to outside forces of change.
  Village studies have been overwhelmingly preoccupied with representing the Vietnamese
nation as a “nation of villages.” Most works on rural Vietnam describe the village as an
inward-looking place profoundly oriented towards the traditional past, with its political
autonomy, economic self-sufficiency, and closed corporate organization (reinforced by the
practice of village endogamy) constituting a stable, self-contained microcosm [for example,
Phan Huy Leˆ et al. ]. However, the divergent “moral economy” [Scott 	] and
“rational economy” [Popkin ] analyses of the Vietnamese rural communities have in a
way contributed to revise some of the misconceptions about peasant resistance to change.
  See, for one, Grossheim [	: ; ].
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the village, detailing the measures designed to ensure law and order, the hng c
contained therefore a mixture of administrative rules, customary laws and religious
guidelines the purpose of which was to regulate the interactions and relationships of each
village’s society. The existence of these bylaws had led to the famous adage “The
customs of the village have precedence over the laws of the king” (Phép vua thua l làng).
In reality, these bylaws were always scrutinized by officials to make sure that they did
not go against the spirit of imperial laws. As a matter of fact, the villages were far less
autonomous than the popular saying would suggest, and the degree of independence
varied with the central government’s ability to carry its policies out. Most of the time,
nevertheless, the dynamics of state-local relations were characterized by transactions
over the state’s access to local resources, and those transactions would reflect the
tensions brought about by the state’s attempts for political, economic, and cultural
integration. There were of course inevitable differences in the pattern of village admin-
istration and society between North, Centre, and South, as beneath the broad picture of
institutional conformity there was probably considerable diversity in actual village
arrangements, particularly regarding differences of origin and size, and patterns of power
and wealth involving the dominant village families. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that,
in the course of the Nam tin, the southward progression of the Vietnamese, the same
essential traits had been taken south and reproduced in a new environment.)
State and Village in the Kingdom of i Vit
The communal charters, with their special features in structure, relationship and tradi-
tion, contained anyway potential germs of centrifugation, as they were bound to clash
with the rules and edicts from the central government. The emperors of the Leˆ dynasty,
for one thing, were well aware of these separatist tendencies, and attempted to limit the
scope of the hng c, in order to wrest power and authority back to the centre.
Indeed, as soon as it was established, the Leˆ court moved vigorously toward 	i
Vit’s centralization, determined as it was to control the villages for the sake of the
stability of political power, the management of manpower, and the expansion of arable
land. In  Leˆ Thái T
 had new family and land registers drawn up and made the
distinction between three categories of villages, small (tiu xa˜) of less than  families, run
each by  xa˜ quan; average (trung xa˜) from  to  families, with  xa˜ quan each; and
large (i xa˜) of over  families, with  xa˜ quan each [Cng Mc 		: I, ]. But it was
Leˆ Thánh-toˆng who set the appellations of the authority of the village heads and the
mode of their appointment: in 
 he changed the title of xa˜ quan to xa˜ trng, then in
  See, for example, Hickey [	
], describing the history and institutions of the village of
Khánh Hu in Long An province, south of Saigon. As for recent case studies, see Kleinen
[		] and Papin [forthcoming].
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 ordered the officials of huyn (sub-prefectures) and chaˆu (districts) to summon the xa˜
trng to the capital with the census registers in view of collating them [Toàn Th :
II, ]. In  he decided that sub-prefects and district chiefs were to choose and appoint
the head of every commune, together with his secretary (xa˜ s) and assistant (xa˜ t),
among former students (nho sinh) or graduates (sính ), and ordained that prefecture and
district officials were to prevent the nomination of two or more xa˜ trng among relatives
in the same village (this order was repeated in ) [ibid.: II, , ].) Thereby the
concern was expressed for having available for peacekeeping local officials sufficiently
infused with the official way of thinking to be loyal defenders of the monarchy. In
controlling village administration, the aim was thus to consolidate central authority
through the expansion of population and the dissemination of Confucian ethics. For,
even if he recognized implicitly that the villages were managed by men from their very
midst by having the officials of the huyn and chaˆu appoint those recommended by the
villagers to the post of xa˜ trng, Leˆ Thánh-toˆng would not tolerate the independence of
the rural communities.
Therefore, it does not appear, as has been too readily asserted [UBKHXH Vit Nam
: 	], that the villagers elected the xa˜ trng on their own accord and that the
autonomy of the village had expanded during the reign of Leˆ Thánh-toˆng. Above all, the
central government’s will manifested itself through the prerequisites imposed on the
person of the xa˜ trng. Indeed, to be qualified as xa˜ trng, the recipient had to be a
learned person as well as a mature and virtuous member of a good family. There was also
a provision in the Hng c thin chính th (The Book of Good Government of the H	ng

c Reign) to the effect that if a xa˜ trng would form cliques or harm public morals, then
the person that recommended him first should be punished [Yu Insun 	: ]. Expec-
ted to be the “vanguard of moral transformation,” the xa˜ trng had therefore the duty to
provide the villagers with guidance and to lead them towards goodness and away from
immorality [ibid.: ].
The reforms accomplished under the first Leˆ emperors marked the high-water point
in the degree to which the state endeavoured to control the resources of the country.
They were actually associated with the fiscal demands of the royal government: a new
fiscal base for the state was laid, with the formalization of a new pattern of land tenure,
in which public lands (coˆng in) were regularly parcelled out among the inhabitants,)
and at the same time served to guarantee the village’s collective obligations to the state
(the communal land taxes and the head taxes levied on the registered villagers were to
  In  the number of xa˜ amounted to 
 [Toàn Th : II, ].
  The distribution of land was the extreme form of interference that the state could assume
in agricultural production and land possession: the state retained the right to elaborate the
whole system of land usage, to decide on the size of land-holdings for all of its subjects,
from the lowest to the most notable. For the regulations on land allocation of the H	ng 
c
period, see Cng Mc [: I, , ].
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provide the public treasury with regular revenues), while private lands (t in) allowed
a pattern of independent peasant production to develop.) Allotting a more substantial
role to smallholding peasants and tenants, the new social order would reinforce the
kingdom by providing larger rural revenues and permitting more effective penetration of
the countryside, as the regulation of the disposition of communal lands would enable the
central government to strongly inject itself into local village affairs. The reforms
contributed also to the stabilization of the rural communities: communal lands were to be
distributed periodically, every six years, to all of the villagers and the distribution was to
be determined by the social rank of each individual; they could neither be sold nor
transmitted by inheritance; the formation of large land holdings was forbidden. The
principal objective of the Leˆ fiscal system as it took form in the s and s was
especially to keep private hands off the coˆng in. In so doing, the government achieved
considerable success in keeping the villages and their resources locally independent and
directly linked to the capital [Whitmore : ]. On the district level, in jurisdictions
of  villages, district officials gathered census data and promoted textually based
Confucian social norms. The officials’ principal new tasks included the encouragement of
agriculture, the standardization of weights and measures, and the promulgation of
exhortatory moral prescripts [Toàn Th 	: II, 	]. On the sub-district level the
s saw a major effort, as mentioned above, to restructure the role of the xa˜ trng, in
order both to consolidate district efforts and to bring Confucian ideology deeper into
society.
The officials of the sub-prefectures and the districts not only saw to the distribution
of land, they also directly collected poll and land taxes. As the accuracy of the
registration of the different categories of villagers was fundamental to the determination
of the taxes to be paid to the state and the periodical redistribution of communal lands,
their duty was to directly supervise the classification of adult males during the compila-
tion of the registers of households (inh b) and lands (in b). But the xa˜ trng were
supposed, every four years, to revise these registers, for the drawing up of which they
were directly responsible, and on which the imposition of taxes and the recruitment of
manpower for military service and corvée labour (coˆng dch) were founded.) Neverthe-
  Yumio Sakurai argues that the autonomy of the village, centred on the distribution of state
land (coˆng in), was weakened by encroachments made by the state in the early Leˆ period
[Sakurai ]. Private ownership was attested by a royal ordinance of 	 stipulating the
conditions for the sale and the purchase of rice fields [see Ngoˆ Kim Chung ].
  At least four types of register were usually kept: two for the benefit of higher-level offi-
cials, the other two for use solely within the village. In the former category were the in
b (register of fields) on which the assessment of land tax was based; and the inh b
(register of recorded villagers subject to obligations), whichalthough listing only some of
the inhabitantsformed the basis of the village’s assessment for corvée and personal taxes.
The other two records were the s thu thu	 (tax collection list) used to allocate the tax
burden among the inhabitants; and the s h
ng xa˜ (list of categories of people) used for the
actual allocation of communal lands.
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less, it was not up to them to decide who would be liable for conscription: the state based
on the inh b to enlist those individuals liable for military service.
Leˆ Thánh-toˆng, however, seemed to have been unable to regulate the village com-
pletely. In fact, while forbidding the application of the private village code (tc l) which
had long been the basis for village customs, he tolerated it in some way by allowing it to
survive on the condition that it were rewritten by a person of virtue within the village.
He was probably not averse to allowing the village a certain amount of autonomy
provided that this did not go against national interests. Thus, if the need temporarily
arose for the distribution of communal land following the promotion or dismissal of an
official, the death or coming of age of a village member, freedom was given to the xa˜
trng to carry it out.
Anyway, the early period of the Leˆ dynasty corresponded to an era of peace, when
the central government exercised effective control over land, private and communal,
when banditry was minimized, when public works were maintained, and when the local
village elites, who held positions of leadership thanks to their economic status or their
kinship and education, were the most strictly regulated, to the benefit of the population
at large. But a change took place in the first half of the sixteenth century, with a decline
in the political importance of the monarchy as the result of the internal political conflict
which caused the breakdown of central authority, until then remarkably effective and
stable. The state of civil war monopolized the attention of the men of power, for whom
the priority was the strengthening of their military supremacy rather than the control of
the villages. The ensuing deterioration of state authority unleashed the centrifugal
tendencies characterizing village society, each village going in the direction of increasing
its own autonomy, since it had no recourse but to solve its own problems by itself.
Although few historical sources referred to the situation within villages during this
period, it is possible to infer, from what we could gather from the documents of the time,
that by then the rural commune had considerably freed itself from central government
supervision. The weakening of governmental control benefited mainly the position of
the village elites, who took advantage of population dispersal resulting from the civil
wars to usurp land and create vast estates, while impoverished peasants attempting to
escape state demands of taxes and corvée (and forfeiting their rights to communal land
in so doing) sought to bind themselves and their services to wealthy families in return for
protection and economic security [Ngoˆ Kim Chung ]. Furthermore, the troubled
times introduced a third social actor into the binary organization of state-village relation-
ships, with the sudden increase of the floating population of migrant labourers, itinerant
peddlers, religious figures and criminal groups that had always existed outside state and
village control.
While the military demands of civil war strained the resources of the system, the
deteriorating socio-economic situation required that measures be taken to restore social
order. Therefore, in the mid-seventeenth century, when the north-south confrontation
  
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between the Trnh and the Nguyn entered a period of respite, the Trnh lords sought to
strengthen state authority in the name of the restored Leˆ dynasty, and at the same time
to reinstate the social order within the village by stressing Confucian ideology. Trnh
Tc’s Confucian-oriented policy concentrated first on revitalizing the bureaucratic
system and on keeping land and manpower out of the private control of influential
families (th gia). In , a decree detailed the functions of local officials who were in
direct contact with the population, and the penalties against official encroachment on
property rights [T V∞n Tài : 	]. In order to gain a better control of the
countryside, the central government concentrated on institutionalizing the social and
political elements of the local population [Nguyn Th Anh 	b: 
	
]. Some 
villages covered then the lowlands of what is now northern Vietnam; at the bottom of the
administrative hierarchy, they were more crucial than ever not only for taxation and
military service, but also for the maintenance of social order. In , instructions were
given to prefecture and district magistrates to nominate as xa˜ trng, xa˜ s (secretary) and
xa˜ t (assistant) individuals chosen among honest, uncorrupted, just, diligent and learned
people, or Confucian students. Those village chiefs would represent their communities to
the government, handle judicial cases, and explain to the people the court’s moral
precepts twice a year. Thus directly appointed by district officials, the village chiefs were
more integrated than before into the governmental structure of the kingdom [Yu Insun
: ]. If the villagers still had their word to say concerning the choice of their
administrators, the latter, once appointed, were considered as parts of the national
mandarinate: the system of evaluation of the xa˜ trng’s merits, introduced in the Cnh
Tr reign (
), rewarded their zeal with promotions to district offices (huyn quan)
[Hin Ch	ng 
	: III, chap. 	]. But the submission of the village chiefs to the official
evaluation system would mean that henceforth negligence of duty or behaviour deviat-
ing from the Confucian line would no longer be tolerated from them. On the other hand,
they were required to report annually all the legal cases of their villages, closed or not, to
district officials.
State interference into village affairs reached a further step with the specification of
new regulations on the registration of the population and the levy of taxes, for the
purpose both of cutting down on peasant movements and keeping the peasants tied to
their land and their villages, and of eliminating evil practices by village authorities and
securing for the state the necessary revenue and manpower. It was decided after 	 to
replace the census system enforced up to then with a “stabilized regime” of registration
(bình l), each village being given a fixed taxation and manpower quota, and tax
collections and the mobilization of manpower placed under the direct surveillance of
province and prefecture officials [C	ng M
c : II, 	]. No longer allowed to
negotiate the calculation of their taxation, the villages could supposedly be more tightly
controlled. Nonetheless, as since  the village authorities were held responsible for
apportioning the incidence on households of the share of the government’s requirements
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C T= AC= : Village versus State
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for revenue to be met by the commune (assessed by the district mandarins), the state in
fact relinquished its control over individuals. By concentrating its growing demands
upon the villages as administrative units rather than dealing directly with persons or
families, the state lost contact with individual villagers.
Political stability did not last long, however. The last two decades of the seventeenth
century witnessed a deepening administrative crisis, as the incompetence and corruption
of the officials in charge of enforcing law and order caused the discontent of the people
and thus undermined the position of the central government. The result was an
increasingly turbulent countryside. The particular case of the village of a-giá-thng
(in present Ninh Bình province) shed light on the failure of the authorities in securing
order: having built a rest house for travellers, its inhabitants would, after dark, put to
death all those who stopped by to seize their belongings; their industry lasted for more
than  years before it was discovered in  [Nguyn Th Anh b: ].
The crisis was sharpened by natural disasters, themselves in part the result of
administrative shortcomings, above all the neglect of irrigation works. Several provinces
were severely hit by floods or droughts and their unavoidable sequence of famines: Sn
Nam in ; Thanh Hóa in  and ; Sn Taˆy, Sn Nam and Thanh Hóa in 	; Sn
Nam and Hi Dng in ; Thanh Hóa in 
 then again in . Relief work was slow
and ineffective, and as usual, deprivations intensified the tendency of the peasants to
leave their villages and wander. They either took shelter under the power of the wealthy
families, or joined bandit gangs, or made up the main body of insurgents in the popular
revolts that broke out for instance in 	 in Hi Dng, or in 	 in Sn Taˆy. The social
and political consequences of this situation were reflected in the drop of the recorded
population in the registers. Those who did not leave their village had to bear the entire
fiscal burden. Opportunity was offered in this way to the rich and powerful to accumu-
late in their hands both private and communal land. Only in  did the government try
to check the process by prohibiting influential families and mandarins from gaining
control of large estates and large numbers of followers [Cng Mc 	: II, ]. Thus,
after Leˆ D-toˆng ascended the throne in 
, financial disaster was threatening the
central government as state resources had been sharply reduced: over a total of 
fiscal units inscribed on the roles in the beginning of the eighteenth century, only 
(less than one third) actually paid taxes to the government; the rest was attributed as
allowances to the aristocracy and to military and civil officials [Nguyn Th Anh b:
	].
Against such a background of social instability, the diverse efforts made to secure
the collection of taxes and manpower needed by the state could hardly achieve their aim.
With the promulgation in  of the ordinance on the equal distribution of land (Quaˆn
cp coˆng 	i
n l) [Cng Mc 	: II, 	], the government resigned itself to take into
consideration village conventions: it was no longer up to district officials to decide upon
the order of priority for the allocation of coˆng 	i
n, henceforth carried out according to
  
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the ranking of the villagers as determined on their own initiative. Furthermore, the
responsibility of land redistribution was entirely entrusted to the xa˜ trng [Hin Chng
: VI, chap. ]. This led to a shift in the concept of coˆng in, considered more and
more as land owned in common by the village rather than as state land. Another
consequence was the generalization of the fraudulent practice of omitting the registra-
tion of coˆng in in land records, since duty was not to be levied on unregistered land (lu
in). The decision made in  to tax private land for the first time had certainly
something to do with the diminution of land revenues due to such a practice. Then in
 Trnh Cng introduced a new system of taxation called toˆ-dung-iu (land, head,
and service) modelled on that of the Tang dynasty of China [Cng M	c : II, ].
Tantamount to an abrupt increase of the tax load, this new system was bound to come up
against the opposition of the villages, and had to be abolished in . A new modus
operandi for population census was then adopted, whereby the xa˜ trng were called on
to report the increase or decrease in population to be recorded, but no actual resurvey of
the population was carried out [Hin Chng : VI, chap. ; Cng M	c : II, ].
Thence, it appeared impractical to tax and conscript villagers individually, and ever since
the imposition of taxes and military service on the village as a unit was established as a
normal procedure.
The last step of the autonomy of the villages in the choice of their heads was taken
in the eighteenth century. Phan Huy Chú noted indeed in his Quan ch
c chí (Mandarinal
Offices) that beginning with the Long c (	) and Vı›nh Hu (	) reigns, the
designation of the communal authorities was left to the villagers, and district mandarins
no longer proceeded to the examination of their records in view of their promotion to
higher positions. The right bequeathed to villagers to select their xa˜ trng meant the
resignation of the state in its efforts to control the village and, consequently, a greater
dependence of the xa˜ trng on the village elite, because in the absence of state support,
it was not possible for the xa˜ trng to restrain the power of the notables, and he had to
gradually become their follower. Of course, subsequent edicts to regulate the village
would still be promulgated from time to time, but they were nothing more than vain
attempts of the state to reassert its jeopardized authority.
By the end of the Leˆ dynasty the development of self-government in the xa˜ had gone
so far that the commune was the only legal entity with which the government had
dealings. It had become so much more important than the family that even penal
responsibility was deemed collective. For example, the discovery of a corpse on the
village’s land (which included not just the houses but also fields and forest up to the
territory of the next commune) could lead to the uprooting of the village and banishment
of its members or to the levying of such a crushing collective fine that the villagers chose
to abandon hearth and home of their own accord and flee elsewhere. In any event, having
established its own autonomy, the village presented already some of the features that
were to characterize it in the nineteenth century, under the Nguyn dynasty.
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State and Village under the Nguyn Dynasty
When he got down to lay the foundations of a modern state, Gia Long, the founder of the
Nguyn dynasty, had to restore first an administration and an economy devastated by 
years of civil war during the Taˆy Sn interlude. If the reconstruction of the social and
political order took some time, the regime set up by Gia Long was an absolute monarchy.
Confucianism was made central to the administrative structure, in view of reinforcing
the state’s control over the society. Bureaucratic centralization closely modelled on
borrowed Chinese institutions (in  legislation was revised with the substitution of a
new law code inspired by the code of the Qing to the old Hng c code of the Leˆ) was the
weapon with which the Nguyn dynasty fought centrifugal trends, military and political,
in the provinces [Woodside ].
However, the effect of the reforms undertaken by Gia Long () and his
successor, Minh Mnh (), was to emphasize the symbolic unity of a national state
but to do little to secure it by practical means. Stress was laid, to a much greater degree
perhaps than under the previous dynasties, on the need for the emperor to approve, by
the issue of certificates of appointment, the tutelary spirit to be worshipped in each
village as a way of confirming village harmony and obtaining prosperous harvests. It
was by investing the village god with its stamp of approval that the state exerted control
over village religion, bringing thus the Vietnamese countryside under state authority
from within through the village matrix. But when the vermilion signature and seal had
been appended, it was as if the emperor had thereby discharged his responsibility for
good government in that particular village once and for all, relying on the Confucian
maxim “Like the boiling of a small fish, the government of a large state should not be
overdone” [Duncanson 	: 
]. The centralizing state, even as it brought localities into
a greater degree of conformity with a set of overarching Confucian normative patterns,
gave the impression of allowing for localized variations. Yet, while the cult of the
tutelary deity symbolically communicated the political fact of village autonomy, it also
served to maintain the presence of the emperor who alone could, and must, deliver
credentials to each tutelary deity before it could exercise its guardianship over the
village properly. In this way, what could stand for the instrument of village immunity
from governmental encroachment became the instrument of direct linkage to the throne.
In reality, the structure of power was not actually very impressive: at any one time,
probably fewer than  individuals performed mandarinal functions as full laureates
of the civil service examination system revived by Gia Long in , a rather small
number of administrators for a society of perhaps  or  million people [Smith ;
]. On the other hand, the substantial extension of the territoriality of the dynasty
created problems in the construction of the political order, and contested identities kept
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on growing at the margins that the Vietnamese political center controlled imperfectly.
The pioneer plains of the ng Nai and the Mekong in particular, originally part of
Cambodia and only gradually brought under Vietnamese control, still remained a fron-
tier land under the first emperors of the Nguyn dynasty. Thus, of the  officially
recorded male taxpayers in all of Vietnam in , only 	

 of them lived in the six
southern provinces, and southern land-holding patterns were not surveyed until 	
[Nguyn ThAnh : ; Huºnh La ]. Indeed, the attempted political, economic
and cultural integration did not go without strains, as the apparatus of the Confucian
state seemed alien-remote in space, superfluous in purpose, and more often than not in
conflict with the village’s interests or those of its leaders. At any rate, the villages acted
part way to meet the government’s efforts at administrative centralization, agreeing to
the state’s access to local resources in order to maintain a degree of autonomy. As a
result, the Hi Vaˆn pass stood out apparently as the geographical divide between two
forms of village organization. North of the pass, most villages had been established
during the state-sponsored migration of peoples from areas of the northern Hanoi-based
kingdom, and their charters were rooted in a system of communal land tenure dating
from the Leˆ times. South of the pass, less “traditional” communities made up part of the
territory of the Nguyn chúa in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and had
become the point of departure for further southward expansion by the Vietnamese. The
advance of the pioneer front and distance from the political center explained that
southern communities had at their disposal more private land, and this was reflected in
the three different scales of land taxes applied to the North, the Centre and the South.)
On the contrary, concerning the system of conscription, each village in the Centre was
required to draft  infantryman (lính) for every  registered inhabitants (inh), whereas
the ratio would be /
 for the South, and only / for the North. Such a system was
indicative of the higher degree of reliance the imperial government held for the inhabit-
ants of the Centre, as well as its greater control of the population of this region.)
Under these conditions, the village appeared outwardly as an agricultural settlement
marginally attached to the state, superficially touched by its “Great Tradition.” Its
economy, which was somewhat below self-sufficiency, neither called for state support nor
 Detailed in Nguyn Th Anh [: 	]. The land registers (a b) and census records
(inh b), compiled meticulously since  as part of the administrative reforms, provided a
fundamental tax base.
 Recruits chosen by the villages tended to be the “unsettled” (daˆn lu, not recorded in the
registers) and landless, although the practice was expressly forbidden. Upon demobiliza-
tion, soldiers were encouraged, as in earlier generations, to found fresh 	n i
n (agricul-
tural colonies), especially in the South: these were supposed to constitute pockets of loyalty
in otherwise unreliable regions. But how far could this device really secure loyalty must
remain an open question, for desertion even from the ranks was notoriously widespread,
and rebels seemed to flourish in the vicinity of the 	n i
n just the same.
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encouraged undue state depredation. Even the head and land taxes, and other state dues,
such as public and military service, were assessed by the central government on the basis
of figures supplied by the village itself, and levied on the village as a unit depending upon
the taxable population.
But a rather special institution, known as the tng (canton), linked the villages to the
central administration. A tng was an administrative unit composed of two to five
villages placed under the authority of a chief, and sometimes a sub-chief as well. These
persons’ duties to the central government, via the head of the sub-prefecture (huyn), were
to collect taxes from their area and to draft military recruits. In practice, they became the
messengers, brokers and mediators poised between the government and the villages.
They transmitted orders down and requests up. Their status and mode of recruitment
reflected a delicate balance between the centre and the periphery. They were selected by
the district or prefecture mandarins from the lists submitted to them by the villages to be
affected. Their selection was acknowledged and honoured by a formal, though provi-
sional, appointment from the court. If they served satisfactorily for three years, the
appointment became permanent and they were given the title of mandarin at grade 
(bát phm). Three additional years of service with a perfect record would move them to
grade  (tht phm), but that was as far as they could go. They enjoyed exemption from
taxation and corvée labour, but their salaries were not comparable to those of the regular
mandarins. For these reasons, villagers considered them still very much their own
people, of a kind with their notables. The assimilation of the tng officers into the
mandarinate was symbolic rather than substantial, but a very clever symbol it was, for
while it conferred honour on the villages, it also reminded them that they were integrated
into a larger scheme of things called the nation [Trng Bu Laˆm : ]. The tng’s
importance as an administrative unit was seen in the manner in which an individual
formally identified himself in nineteenth century Vietnam: he always mentioned succes-
sively his name, his village, his tng, his district, his prefecture and his province [in
L : 	].
At the level of the village (xa˜) the basic elements were the lª trng, the village
headman, responsible to the bureaucracy for collecting taxes and executing court orders,
and the h	i 
ng hào mc (or kº mc), the council of notables, or elders, who deliberated
and decided on matters concerning the village. The council established policy and
was ultimately responsible for execution as well. It managed the properties of the vil-
lage, particularly its public lands, which in principle it allotted to residents uniformly
since , after Minh Mnh put an end to the regime based on ranks set by Gia Long in
 and decreed the equal repartition of communal land (quaˆn cp khu phn 
in th)
[Nguyn Th Anh : ]. The revenues from public lands provided the notables
with a set of funds for the community’s annual budget. The major expenditure in that
budget went towards the rituals and celebrations organized annually in honour of the
tutelary deity. The council of notables also administered justice, especially to settle civil
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disputes, but offences involving members of two or more villages in the same tng
required the attention of the tng chief, while murder, treason and other serious breaches
of the law would have to be settled higher up.
The council of notables consisted of as many members as were qualified to sit on
it. These included: all villagers  years or older, officials of the central government
in temporary residence at the village (occasioned by mourning, for example), degree-
holders not engaged in a mandarinal career, former executive officers, and wealthy
men who held minor titles purchased from the central government. The composition
of the council of notables indicates that many of its positions were simply honorific.
The very old notables and those in temporary residence at the village could not have
contributed to the council deliberations. The articulate and influential members, there-
fore, were likely to have been degree-holders or, at least, literate persons. They, in
addition, often doubled as village officials since literacy was mandatory in these respon-
sibilities. Rather sparse in the villages, the literati, nevertheless, held considerable power
and consolidated their position as the ruling class, supporter of the state Confucian
ideology.
As the council was too large a body to function on a day-to-day basis, its routine
chores were delegated to village officials (hng chc) whose number depended upon the
size of the village and its population. The head of the village was the lª trng (chief of
village) who functioned as liaison between the tng officers and the village council. His
principal tasks were: to keep the population and land records (inh b and a b), collect
taxes, call up draftees, and recruit manpower for state projects. Selected by the village
council for a term of three years, the lª trng could be reappointed: many in fact held
their posts some  or  years (which fact infers that the post of lª trng was considered
worthwhile in terms of power and prestige). The two assistants to the lª trng were the
cai thoˆn (village commissioner) and the cai tu	n (police commissioner). The cai thoˆn
supervised all public construction of roads, canals, dykes, etc. He saw to the proper
maintenance of the communal house (ình), the symbolic centre and gathering-place of
the village, and the place of worship of the tutelary deity of the community. Village order
was maintained by the cai tu	n. He organized night watches and was otherwise
responsible for the internal security of the community.
An adequate picture of the real structure of power in the village system of Nguy
n
Vietnam is yet to be specified, particularly concerning the relationship between villagers
and mandarins and the precise nature of the concentration of power. Records of the
Confucian examination system indicate the procedures by which a small number of
individuals, drawn probably from the wealthier elements in their respective villages,
could rise to become powerful mandarins at the provincial level or above. At the end of
their careers, after their mandarinal fortunes had been made elsewhere, those always
returned to their native villages, where they maintained the link between the top and
bottom of society, while helping to redefine the villagers’ everyday life [Papin : ]. A
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great many people who could not be categorized as either village leaders or scholar-
mandarins held also influential positions, for example district level officers, who per-
formed tasks not requiring scholarly status, and one may rightfully ask what relation-
ships existed among these “invisible” categories of people. And certainly, those families
which produced scholars and high officials would assign other clan members to look after
the family shrine and estate, and perhaps to control affairs in the clan’s native village.
Anyway, education, wealth, age, all these could be made to serve in the council of
notables, to whom belonged the effective decision-making power in the village adminis-
tration.) It remains that the bipolar distribution of political responsibility between the
court mandarins and the village-based scholar-gentry had led to the existence of a dual
power at the village level.
Anyway, the central government, represented by the district magistrates and their
staff in the administrative seats of the ph and huyn, seemed far away and meant above
all two things: taxes and conscription for military service or corvée labour for the
construction of dikes, irrigation canals, city walls, roads, bridges. Under such a regime,
custom inevitably became the rule rather than law. The village held in fact complete
sway over the lives of its residents, which allows some authors to characterize the
administration of Vietnamese communes as exploitative [Popkin : ]. Decisions
on individual tax rates were normally made by the council of elders on the basis of the
number of registered stakeholders, legitimate villagers declared in the inh b registers
and therefore known to the central government. But there existed a floating population
of unsettled farmers who attached themselves to the village as landless agricultural
labourers and were classified as daˆn lu (the uncontrolled, in violation of the law, who
deliberately evaded taxes or who were too poor to pay taxes), not counting temporary
residents or “outsiders” classified under the categories of khách h or ngoi tch. It was in
the interest of the village leaders, however, to retain the illegal and undefined status of
this rural proletariat: first, the smaller the number of registered residents, the less the
amount of taxes, corvée requirement, and military assessment imposed on the village;
secondly, those who were not on the village register were not eligible for the not easily
stretchable communal lands.
Certainly, the central government’s demands for corvée labour and for the provision
of local materials for road making or for building granaries, ports, citadels (and also the
palaces and royal tombs at Hu) fell on rich and poor in equal measure. But they weighed
most heavily upon the peasants, who hardly shared the religious or political purposes
which inspired their rulers’ building mania. Indeed, the bureaucracy that the Nguyn
strove to build, in spite of its apparently understaffed structure, exceeded the needs of an
agricultural society based on a subsistence system. The lot of the masses stayed
 From this viewpoint, Philippe Papin supposes that the lª tr	
ng was not actually the
notables’ man, but the man of a clan, a family, a lineage [Papin forthcoming].
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unimproved, because of a resolutely agrarian but ineffective policy, which kept the
economy stagnating in the self-sufficiency scheme of a small-scale agriculture, in no way
shifted to commodity production, even in less “traditional” southern communities
marked by more private property and greater participation in the South China Sea
trade. Thus, even though rice had become an item of maritime trade, the Vietnamese
emperors stifled any gain that might have accrued to the delta areas on this account by
placing a ban on the export of rice, in observance of the ancient precept of Confucian
economics, the so-called “ever-even granary” (kho thng bình), whereby grain surpluses
in good years should be stocked by the government when prices were low and sold again
to equalize the market in bad years when prices were high [Nguyn Th Anh : 
].)
Above all, the central government failed in the end to overcome the resistance
of the village authorities in the contest for land control, the most essential aspect
of the peasants’ subsistence base.) The problem of landlessness remained in fact
unsolved, as, faced with the tendency of influential people in the village to misappropriat-
ing land, the government would rather endeavour to have fallow land cleared and
increase rice production than implement land redistribution by confiscating private
land. In reality, such a measure as that applied in  in the province of Bình nh to
impound half of the private holdings in the province and to turn the estates thus
confiscated over to the villages of the province as communal property to be distributed
periodically amongst their villagers was quite exceptional [Nguyn Thiu Laˆu ;
Nguyn Th Anh : 	]. Then, despite multiple previous reiterations of the
ban on selling communal lands, in  T c resigned himself, under the French
threat, to tolerate the sale of communal lands in order to finance his army. Four years
later, in , with the same end in view, he launched the reform of the land tax, which
ultimately sanctioned the evolution of the structure of land ownership towards the
extension of private property at the expense of communal lands [Nguyn Th Anh a].
Thus, the situation immediately prior to the arrival of the French was one of a weak
state, unable to manipulate any aspect of the life of the peasants in a manner favourable
to the development of support, political or fiscal, of the central government by the
villagers, and consequently unable to unify and organize Vietnamese society solidly
enough to keep external enemies at bay. The central government even gave the
 From this viewpoint, the Nguyn’s economic policy seemed to be in regression compared to
the policy of the Leˆ, whose code illustrated a legal tradition that accommodated interna-
tional trade, market exchange and private property rights. In particular, strict rules on the
regulation of foreign trade helped to reinforce the image of an inward-looking Vietnam,
while the rigidity of the Nguyn court’s bureaucratic preconceptions about how foreign
trade should be conducted put a brake on commercial development [see Woodside : 
	

; Nguyn Th Anh ].
 For a precise example, see Papin [	].
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impression of losing interest in the local affairs of the villages, more or less left to their
own devices for the problems concerning the security of their inhabitants or the mainte-
nance of their water control works, guarantee of good harvests [Nguyn Th Anh :
; ].
French Colonial Administration and Vietnamese Village
The formation of the Union indochinoise meant for Vietnam the dismantlement of
its territorial unity, while the bureaucracy of the “protected” Vietnamese king was
merged into a highly centralized system dependent exclusively on the competence
of France’s representatives, who surrogated themselves to the authority of the king
on the one hand, and his mandarins on the other, for the effective exercise of power.
Under such a regime of protectorate, the distinction between direct and indirect rule was
legal rather than practical. However, the trait that, on the surface, gave the French
system the character of indirect rule was especially the preservation of the autonomy of
the village. Indeed, albeit some details (such as land registration) over which practice
differed between the colony of Cochinchina and the protectorates of Annam and Tonkin,
the main features of traditional village administration by notables and of internal
allocation of liability for land tax, of liability for corvée and for military service con-
tinued much as before.
Nonetheless, it must be said from the outset that French colonisation replaced
the dual authority of state bureaucracy and communal council with a unitary adminis-
tration that allowed for the transformation of the space of rural life into a nationally
and internationally connected economic space. Local institutions were not only altered
by the direct actions of the colonial government; they also underwent radical changes
because of the socioeconomic impact of colonisation. The village leaders’ economic
responsibilities towards their own community diminished as the colonial regime intro-
duced new ways and means to consolidate the authority of the central government,
and effected an economic penetration that subtracted increasing percentages of re-
sources. French rule opened also the country to capitalist economic development, and
this development had profound effects on rural life. The specialization, integration and
monetization of the economy massively disrupted social relationships, not counting
the fact that colonial interventions transformed village social relations by creating a
widened gap between conflicting sets of leadership criteria (Confucian values of age
and generation against changing access to education, wealth and social power). The
permanency and intimacy of shared values which had helped to check abuse in the
past gave in thus to the stronger imperatives of modern economics. In particular,
the commercialisation of the countryside resulted in the dislocation of rural populations,
as labour and land were shaken loose from their historic roots and mobilized as
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resources): the proof is that, when the French administration came in the s to
implement thorough statistical surveys of land ownership and land distribution, it was
not interested in village structures but only in the application of “modern” categories of
individual (or household) ownership, tenure, etc. [Henry ].
Through their economic policies, the colonial authorities forced therefore the villages
into the overbearing world of the state. Some institutional restructuring was effected, in
so far as the village councils of notables and the village leaders were subjected to
demands that they carry out administrative functions for the colonial administration. In
other words, they were required to become the agents and servants of a central power
that, to make matters worse, also held confusingly alien views. What happened in the
councils of notables of colonial times deviated from earlier patterns: the sudden dis-
appearance of the traditional balances between country and town, the role of which was
no longer limited to that of a mere administrative centre, and between the literate and the
common man disrupted the mechanism of authority. As power changed hands, leaving
the countryside for the town, while the realm of knowledge became peripheral to politics,
the village matrix ceased to function.
All the reforms the French attempted to introduce at the local level simply confirmed
further the fact that local institutions no longer served local needs. Village leaders had
to collect on behalf of the colonial government such taxes as having increased tenfold
over what they had been in traditional times.) They were obliged to implement the laws
of the colonial government, including the highly unpopular law against local production
 Cf. for example Nguyn Th Anh [	]. In the Mekong delta, the process of agricultural
development between the end of the nineteenth century and the s produced in some
areas a pattern of landownership and tenure quite uncharacteristic of traditional Vietnam,
with the formation of two social groups, the in ch (landowners) and the tá in (tenant
farmers), the former group including both absentee large landowners and small land
owners, whose living conditions were not necessarily very different from those of the tá in,
squeezed between the French colonial authorities and the large landowners [see Brocheux
].
 Indochina’s fiscal regime was established in 	 by governor general Paul Doumer who
introduced the common general budget funded by the proceeds of indirect taxes (customs,
taxes on opium, alcohol, salt, etc.), while revenues from direct taxes (land and poll taxes)
were assigned to the regional administrations. Until the mid-s, alcohol, salt and opium
excises supplied up to 	 percent of all the taxes the colonial regime collected. In general
the formal tax burden on Vietnamese peasant families, measured both in money terms and
in relation to rice yields, increased significantly between the s and the s. Attempts
to impose any kind of “progressive” direct taxation in rural areas were doomed to failure,
however, given the limitations of rural administration. On the other hand, the colonial
authorities tried their best to eliminate formal exemptions from personal tax on the ground
of official status. An important reform was the abolition of the grande corvée (unregulated
forced labour for major public works) in Cochinchina in  and the commuting of the
petite corvée (five days’ labour on village maintenance) for a small tax payment to the
budget of the xa˜, which then hired labour instead. The reform was applied later in Tonkin
and Annam: reduction to 
 days a year and, after intermediate reductions, absorption into
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of alcohol. They were responsible for controlling banditry and preventing rebellion in
their local communities. The village that supported or harboured a rebellion was
severely punished. Among the possible penalties were the dissolution of the village
community and its annexation to neighbouring villages, the confiscation of property
belonging to villagers, and the levying of fines against the leaders and notables of the
village.
Under these conditions, many qualified men shirked participation in village councils
or in village leadership positions, rather than serve as agents of a government for which
they received little or no benefits and for which they made themselves vulnerable to the
resentment of both villagers and authorities. Those who sought positions on councils
tended to be those who were more concerned with their personal fortunes than with
promoting communal interests. As early as , the crisis affecting the administration
of rural communities was obvious to the Lieutenant-Governor of Cochinchina as he
wrote. “The recruitment of notables becomes, unfortunately, more and more difficult in
some provinces; the prosperous and honorable families show a certain repugnance for
these perilous functions, which thus too often fall into the hands of those who are
unskilled, and even, sometimes, dishonest” [Osborne : ].
The difficulty was not confined to Cochinchina, where there was no pretence of
indirect rule; the countryside of the two protectorates of Annam and Tonkin was affected
as well. The core of the problem lay in the French compulsion to control Vietnamese
villages in ways never before attempted by the Vietnamese court. The colonial
government’s fear of resistance lurking in the countryside motivated it to assert this
control in many ways, including that of imposing its ideas on how a country should be
run, that is, always from the centre. Given the motivations of the French, it was only
normal that they would want to see on the council of notables persons on whose
allegiance they could count. Attempts were, therefore, made by the colonial authorities,
repeatedly, with all means at their disposal, to pack as many of the village councils as
possible with candidates of their choice, in total disregard of the traditional village
criteria for selection.)
Yet, despite their recognition that the village social organization was deteriorating,
the French implemented policies that purported to bring some order to the chaos of
communal administration, but had the opposite effect of causing further disintegration of
communal life. In , a decree reduced the number of notables in the councils and
defined the functions of these members in terms of the requirements of colonial local

the personal tax in Annam in 	 and in Tonkin after . It was to trigger, nevertheless,
a large movement of protest in 	 in Central Vietnam [see Nguyn Th Anh 
; :
].
 For example, the incident reported by Smith [	: 
], in which a slate of Catholics took
over an entire council of notables in the province of Taˆn An in 	.
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administration rather than the needs of the local community. In , communal
elections were established in Tonkin, then in , the councils’ autonomy was increased
in both Tonkin and Cochinchina, with the provision however that the notables were
subject to approval by the province chief. The purpose of these measures was to invest
a limited number of notables in each xa˜ with responsibility for actual performance, in
replacement of the informal assemblies of the past in which all the notables had had a
voice but no responsibility. They were presented as a step toward the establishment of
democratic institutions at the local level, but in reality they undermined the authority of
the councils in the eyes of villagers, whereas they increased rather than diminished the
bickering, corruption, and local factionalism that were traditional to Vietnamese village
life [Pinto : ].
Actually, the consequence of the intervention of the colonial administration in
village affairs was that it alienated the notables from the rest of the population. Whether
particular notables continued to be chosen by the villagers or in fact received their
appointments from the government was immaterial; in practice, they quickly ceased to
represent their fellow villagers. Instead, they turned into agents of a central government
which demanded their total allegiance, at no return wage, for the government paid them
no salary. It simply amended the traditional village convention to say that the notables
should now act on its behalf, exclusively. Accordingly, initiative gave way to administra-
tive routine, and personal relationship yielded to bureaucratic detachment. The glaring
abuses of the notables described in novels and other writings of the colonial period derive
largely from that altered relationship.) Village administrators no longer needed their
constituents. They experienced a new freedom in their positions, which allowed them to
manipulate land allotments, taxes and so on.) Their fellow-villagers could no longer
make or unmake them, as the last word now rested with an outside power.
The colonial authorities, whether through insensitivity or necessity, transmitted
through the notables requirements that far exceeded the normal expectations of the old
court of Hu. For example, on behalf of rational management, demands were made that
the centuries-old tax assessment based on the village as a whole be converted to one
based on individual villagers and individual pieces of land. Where the notables of the
past had sometimes downgraded the tax value of the village and showed flexibility in
assessing the dues of villagers from year to year, every man was now to be tied singly and
inexorably to his prescribed share. Improved recording and auditing techniques, coupled
with accurate and frequent land surveys, made it very difficult for villagers to under-
 In particular Ngoˆ Tt T with his work Vic làng (Affairs of the Village), see Boudarel
[].
 The imposition of taxes, direct and indirect, created indubitably the opportunity for the
dominant “rich” elements in each village to use their influence to the disadvantage of
poorer families, as the increased burden would be less than equitably distributed between
rich and poor in each village community.
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report figures, as they had done from time immemorial. To make sure that the notables
executed their tasks as ordered, the French marked off their personal fortunes as security
for the quota of village revenue.
The most serious breach of village trust occurred when the colonial government
required of the notables that they inform their administrative superiors of all village
activities that touched in any way upon the interest of the government; this, in addition
to filing regular reports on a number of assigned issues. As for customary law, the
French authorities made that defer, whenever possible, to French law. Whereas disputes
in traditional Vietnam had been settled essentially through arbitration and practically all
derelictions and crimes short of manslaughter or high treason were adjudicated in the
villages themselves without outside interference, village notables had as additional
obligation to function as judiciary officials, whose presence at the district capital could be
required everyday, as one case or another needed settlement. These extra duties
burdened the notables greatly at the same time as it fanned the resentment of their
fellows. For these reasons, although a seat on the council could be used lucratively, many
shied away from the ignominy it carried. Therefore, responsible persons respected for
their traditional qualities saw little reason to squander away their social prestige on an
office which, changes notwithstanding, remained subordinate to French interests. This,
inopportunely, gave the more marginal elements of society the chance to emerge in
village councils.)
When the Second World War broke out, the French were caught still fighting this
battle for the loyalty of competent men. The war made it even more necessary that they
should win the Vietnamese away from Japanese influence. Consequently, a decree was
issued in , abolishing all formal elections of notables and allowing instead for the
selection of these men by informal consensual agreement. It was then too late. The
degradation of the sociopolitical institution of village council, much debased because of
its subservience to the French administrative machinery, had been such that the deterio-
ration in the relationship between villagers and their leaders had become irremediable.)
At the village level, the foundation of leadership had completely grown estranged from
the population. Appointed by the colonial administration or by one another with the
acquiescence of the colonial administration, the notables were seen as detrimental to
the interests of villagers. Their legitimacy had long ceased to stem from the recognition
 To quote Smith [: ], “In a report of , the Governor of Cochinchina complained
that the notables of the villages were for the most part very inferior to their task, not only
because of their barely elementary education, but even more because they bring to their
work a routine spirit hostile to every new idea.” The fact was, the report continued, that
fewer and fewer people wanted to become notables so that good candidates rarely pre-
sented themselves for office.
 For other assessments concerning changes in the villages, see Woodside [: ],




of an authority derived from personal virtue and attainment, as in the past. It was
therefore easy for Vit Minh propaganda to denounce them as the henchmen of an
intolerable regime, when it concentrated on mobilizing the peasants against taxation,
corvée labour, rice requisitioning by the administration to meet Japan’s requirements for
food supplies.)
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